THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AS THE BACKGROUND OF PERSONIFICATORY AND DEPERSONIFICATORY METAPHORS IN PROVERBS AND ELSEWHERE

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1. THE ESSENCE OF THE IDEA OF THE GREAT CHAIN

71 years ago, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, the founder of the history of ideas, published his famous book *The Great Chain of Being.*

The naive folk model of the Great Chain of Being has governed the world view of humans in classical antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance, and later. According to that model, all kinds of objects constitute a hierarchical system in which every creature or thing belongs inherently and immutably to a certain level of the Chain. The highest level is occupied by God, this is followed by the angels, various classes of people, animals etc.[1]

Encyclopædia Britannica,[2] for example, emphasises just the three "initial ideas" originating from Plato – The so-called Principle of Plenitude, continuity and gradation. Actually, however, the main course of development of the Great Chain of Being (further: GCB) model took place much later, and just after Plato and Aristotle the "ladder of being" obtained most of its concrete rungs. Plotinus and other neoplatonists contributed greatly, as did St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the impact of the Middle Ages in general was quite strong, as was that of Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment – I will decidedly have no chance to recount the fate and decay of the GCB in detail. At the same time, each step in its development and elaboration in some sense meant the undermining of its authority. Linné, Lamarck and others transformed the initial ladder into a tree. Herder and other romantics began to emphasize the individual value of the human person instead of his or her belonging to a certain class or group. The final deathblow to the GCB came from Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution put the GCB to move.

As the main topics of this paper are metaphors and proverbs, not the GCB itself, I also bypass all the contemporary philosophical discussion around the GCB and the concept of the history of ideas in general.[3]

2. SOME HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Below I will offer just some texts, images and schemas depicting the GCB or some of its parts.

The following is a very frequently quoted fragment of Alexander Pope's (1688–1744) *An Essay on Man* (1734):

> *Vast chain of Being! which from God began,*
> *Natures ethereal, human, angel, man,*
> *Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see,*
> *No glass can reach; from Infinite to thee,*
> *From thee to Nothing. – On superior powers*
> *Were we to press, inferior might on ours:*
> *Or in the full creation leave a void,*
> *Where, one step broken, the great scale's destroyed:*
> *From Nature's chain whatever link you strike.*
> *Tenth or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike* (I.8.237-46).

Medieval model of "three cosms" and "three estates" of human society
Bruce R. Magee, *British Literature* (a lecture course)
http://www2.latech.edu/%7Ebmagee/201/intro2_medieval/estates&chain_of_being_notes.htm


The same with a more detailed categorization of the "mesocosm":

- God → Angels
- Kings/Queens → Archbishops → Dukes/Duchesses → Bishops → Marquises/Marchionesses → Earls/Countesses → Viscounts/Viscountesses → Barons/Baronesses → Abbots/Deacons → Knights/Local Officials → Ladies-in-Waiting → Priests/Monks → Squires → Pages → Messengers → Merchants/Shopkeepers → Tradesmen → Yeomen Farmers → Soldiers/Town Watch → Household Servants → Tenant Farmers → Shepherds/Herders → Beggars → Actors → Thieves/Pirates → Gypsies
- Animals → Birds → Worms
- Plants
- Rocks

The Great Chain of Being. From Didacus Valades, Rhetorica Christiana (1579).

The "ladder of intellect" from Shakespearean times by Michael Best, *Shakespeare's Life and Times*. Internet Shakespeare Editions, University of Victoria: Victoria, BC, Canada 2001–2005
http://ise.uvic.ca/Library/SLTnoframes/ideas/chain.html

3. THE CONTEMPORARY STATUS OF THE GCB: METASTASES AND FANS

It is true that by the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the GCB had lost its status as the basis of the existing philosophical and scientific world picture.

Nevertheless, the GCB is not an altogether forgotten and abandoned topic of research. It is mentioned in a huge number of histories of the natural sciences, theory of evolution, philosophy, art and literature, and so on. A search in Google provides about 63,000 results. There are also several good reasons for this:

1) it has left multiple metastases in present-day science and scholarship, such as

- the problem of directionality versus spontaneity of evolution, the meaningfulness of the very term of progress in general;
- the problem of the place of mankind in nature;
- problems of racism;
- the problem of the very existence of and chances to contact the superhuman, spiritual and divine regions of being.

2) a certain simplified version of it hitherto sits very deeply in our common minds: that humans represent the highest degree of being (if God does not exist), animals are lower, and so on.

The GCB also has its contemporary fans, albeit mostly among semi-esoteric authors such as Ernst F. Schumacher (1977) or Ken Wilber, the developer of the so-called theory of everything and integral psychology (e.g. 2000 [1996]; 200a; 2000b, and tens of other books).

The Traditional Great Chain of Being in several works by Ken Wilber. Seems to be strongly influenced by Ernst F. Schumacher's sequence

$m \rightarrow (m + x) \rightarrow (m + x + y) \rightarrow (m + x + y + z)$ in his book (1977: 27) and elsewhere). Here quoted from:
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptG/part1.cfm/

The Great Chain in Various Wisdom Traditions compiled by Huston Smith (graphic layout by Brad Reynolds) – from not yet published *Toward A Comprehensive Theory of Subtle Energies* by Ken Wilber

Ken Wilber's Model of Four Quadrants

A simplified clarification of the Model of Four Quadrants by Ken Wilber

"Model of seven kingdoms" from *The Reflexive Universe* (1976, Chapter IV) by Arthur M. Young
- Molecules have three axes of symmetry and no freedom
- Plants and atoms have two axes of symmetry (radial and cylindrical) and one degree of freedom
- Animals and nuclear particles have one axis of symmetry (bilateral) and two degrees of freedom
- Light and the "seventh kingdom" (i.e. the spiritual or divine domain) have no symmetry and complete freedom


4. THE GCB AND METAPHORS

Samuel Levin's favourite and recurring example of metaphor in his *The Semantics of Metaphor* (1977) is *The stone died*. Levin lists and analyzes different possibilities for the interpretation (or construal, in his own terms) of the sentence, and obtains, for example, the following variants:

    1) some mythological stone died mythologically;

    2) the stone eroded, was destroyed

    3) the blockhead ~ numskull, or perhaps heartless person died

    and so on

    Some of Levin's combinations feel counterintuitive, because they violate the basic rule for simple linguistical ~ conventional metaphors: The target comes first, and the figurative part follows (see e.g. Turner 1991: 144). The very concept of the conceptual, or cognitive, or experiential *domain* largely used in the Lakoffian cognitive theory of metaphor is quite vague and ambiguous: for some authors it is practically a synonym for the notion or *schema*, for some others it means some abstract categories passing through whatever parts of being and cognition, for some authors it coincides with the main divisions of the GCB, which is the topic of my discussion today.

    In addition, the conceptual domain is a tricky term because it seeks to embrace, simultaneously both the ontological and gnoseological ~ epistemological aspects of being and cognition.

    Anyway, as we know that metaphorical transfers are not made casually, from wherever to wherever, but the traffic between some conceptual areas is very intensive and between some others almost nonexistent, we evidently need some more general frame of reference for the construction of our observations about the directions of metaphor-making.

    As concerns cognition and epistemology, in recent decades the view of the modularity of the human mind has become more and more entrenched in many areas of research: linguistics, the theory of religion, developmental and evolutionary psychology, so-called cognitive archaeology, philosophy and so on. Jerry Fodor (e.g. 1983), Pascal Boyer (e.g. 1994), Jean Piaget (e.g. 1960), Howard Gardner (e.g. 1983), Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (e.g. 1994), Steven Mithen (1996), Dan Sperber (1994) and many others (see, e.g. in Hirschfeld & Gelman, Eds. 1994) have compiled their own lists of mental modules. These sets of modules differ greatly in the number and content of their constituents.

    As to the ontological categories proper, we must return, once again, to the GCB.

    In their seminal book *More than Cool Reason* (1989), George Lakoff and Mark Turner used a certain variant of the GCB model to describe the directionality of proverbial metaphors.

    Lakoff and Turner state that the Great Chain is a naive model about the Nature of Things, appearing both in a basic form as well as in an extended one (includes God and society). In the basic version of the model we see the usual hierarchical order of existing entities (from substances and inanimate objects to plants, animals, and finally human beings as the highest level). The higher the entity, the more qualities or levels of functioning it has. Inanimate objects have only physical qualities (complex objects have also structural and functional features), plants have both physical and biological features, animals have in addition to the

previos qualities also instincts, and human beings have all the common features with lower levels, plus additional specific qualities like reason, higher-order emotions, language, aesthetic sense, personality, sociability etc.

My own drawing inspired by the book
More than Cool Reason (1989, Chapter IV)
by George Lakoff and Mark Turner:

A simplified version
of the figure to the left:

		instincts	instincts
	biological features	biological features	biological features
physical features	physical features	physical features	physical features
THINGS, SUBSTANCES	PLANTS	ANIMALS	HUMAN BEINGS

■ = non-human
■ = shared (non-human + human)
■ = only human

here "LOW" means material, physical, "natural"
"HIGH" means "specifically human" (mental, intellectual, aesthetic, social, "cultural")

Our schema divides levels of existence on two axes: first into the human and the non-human, secondly into the mental and the material (if the higher neural activity of animals is not viewed as being mental). (The figure above is sketched down by me, and thus cannot be found in Lakoff's and Turner's book. All inanimate objects are here brought together to a common level of 'things and substances'; Lakoff and Turner (1989: 170–171) differentiate between natural physical things and complex objects on this level) Thus the human is the focal link in all metaphoric and other mental and linguistic transitions between the areas and levels of the GCB.

The observations of many researchers of figurative language convince us that there are two important distinctors or axes – HUMAN / NON-HUMAN, and PHYSICAL / MENTAL – that govern metaphorical traffic not only in proverbs, but also in idioms, so-called conceptual, conventional and other "linguistic" or "entrenched" metaphors. In everyday linguistical metaphors the transfers are generally simple and unidirectional. That is often different in "poetry proper", however.[4]

Thus all "simple" metaphors can be divided, by and large, into depersonifications and personifications. Thus, paradoxically, man is himself simultaneously the most known and the most unknown and mysterious object; the most typical target and the most typical source of metaphors.

| **Depersonification** is a transfer ~ mapping which represents a human being as an animal:

 John is a gorilla ~ an old hog ~ ...
 He is a wolf in sheep's clothing
 He barked at me, but did not bite
 as a plant:
 He plucked the finest flowers of youth
 I am rooted in the soil of my home
 The apple does not fall far from the tree
 as something inanimate:
 Our boss is sometimes an iceberg and sometimes a volcano
 Daniel Webster is a steam-engine in trousers
 All rivers reach the sea | **Personification** is a transfer ~ mapping which represents non-human beings and objects, as well as substantive properties, activities, ethical categories, abstract notions, expressions, etc. as human:

 The lion is the king of all the beasts
 The scraggy fingers of the trees touched my face
 Spring calls the birds to sing
 The bright sun smiled amicably on his face
 The wind cries in the chimney
 The pale-faced moon looks boldly on the earth
 The tears of clouds washing away the soot
 My soul sings and laughs
 Idleness is the mother of all vices
 Sleep and death are brothers |

Many observations suggest that depersonification is the prevailing direction of transfers in the newer layers of metaphors. Thanks to investigations made by Jean Piaget (1960 and elsewhere), Stewart Guthrie (and others, however, there are serious reasons to suppose that anthromorphic-animistic, i.e. personifying metaphors most likely prevailed in earlier layers of metaphor.

Why and when did such a radical change take place, then?

One hypothesis can be derived from the supposition about animal metaphors in the same book "More than Cool Reason" by Lakoff and Turner. Here is the fragment from it (1989: 193–194):

> One of the most elaborate domains in which we understand the nonhuman in terms of the human is the domain of animal life. There we have well-elaborated schemas characterizing what animals are like, and we usually understand their characteristics metaphorically in terms of the characteristics of human beings. Here are some common propositions that occur in schemas for animals:
> – Pigs are dirty, messy, and rude.
> – Lions are courageous and noble.
> – Foxes are clever.
> – Dogs are loyal, dependable and dependent.
> – Cats are fickle and independent.
> – Wolves are cruel and murderous.
> – Gorillas are aggressive and violent.
> These are metaphorical propositions within schemas. They all involve conventionalized instances of the GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, through which properties of things lower on the chain are understood in terms of human properties. Our folk understanding of what these animals are like is metaphorical. We understand their attributes in terms of human character traits. We think of them, react to them, and treat them as if we would a person with such traits.

There are also serious arguments for and against extrapolating the same train of thought to other kinds of metaphors. I will not speculate on these possibilities in further detail.

5. THE GCB AND PROVERBS

Lakoff and Turner thus emphasise the antropocentric nature of proverbs. Humans are the main objects of interest of proverbs – both directly and figuratively. Thus we can assume that man is also the main target of metaphorical projection in proverbs.

Some of my observations on the direction of metaphorical projections in proverbs, published in the 1970s (see Krikmann 1974: 19, 46; Krikmann 1978: 91; in more detail in Krikmann 1984, written in the middle of the 1970s and published seven years later in a collection edited by G. Permjakov) have later proved to be cases of a more universal tendency.

> For example: "The proverbial trope is mostly paradigmatic, i.e. metaphorical. To be more exact, proverbial transfers seem to be not simply transfers "from the left to the right" or vice versa, but specifically directed and orientated. The proverb tends, very predominantly, to explain the more complicated through the more simple, the less known through the better known; it usually presents, for example, the mental through the physical, the ideal through the material, the social through the biological, the abstract through the concrete, etc. The oppositions 'non-human' ↔ 'human' and 'natural' ↔ 'cultural' seem to play leading role in these alterations or transcodings" (Krikmann 1974: 19).

After encountering Lakoff's and Johnson's arguments, I formulated four rules that (with many eventual concessions and exceptions) seek to define the behaviour of metaphors in proverbs (see also Krikmann 1994: 119–120).

I have used G. A. Miller's terminology from his classification of metaphors (Miller 1979: 229–234). Miller distinguishes between three basic types of metaphors:

> 1) nominal metaphors: BE(x,y) where x does not actually equal y, common examples being "John is a gorilla", "Sally is a block of ice", "Man is a wolf" and others;
> 2) predicative metaphors: G(x), where x is not really or does not do G, i.e. metaphors that diagonally link the subject component from the target domain with the predicative component from the source domain, e.g. "The boy barked at me", "She is withering away", "Time flies" or "Time heals all wounds";
> 3) sentential metaphors: G(y), where y is not actually referred to: these metaphors take the form of a sentence, e.g. J. M. Reddy's example "The rock is becoming brittle with age" describing an old professor of geology (already mentioned as an example in Reddy 1969: 242).

Sentential metaphors seem to be particularly closely related to proverbs. Max Black (1962: ??) marks that when forming sentences that consist solely of metaphorical words we get proverbs, allegories or riddles. I will now formulate the four rules for interpreting proverbial metaphors and briefly discuss some related complications. The bulk of proverb examples are taken from three classical editions: "A Dictionary of American Proverbs" (AP) by Wolfgang Mieder et al., "European Proverbs" (EP) by Gyula Paczolay, and "Proverbia Septentrionalia" (PS) by Matti Kuusi et al.

The four rules

1. If a proverb consists exclusively of words literally denoting objects and concepts belonging to "higher" levels of human functioning (i.e. mental, social etc.), and/or abstract concepts that also belong only to humans, then the proverb is already "at home", i.e. has already become meaningful without any need or possibility for further projection or mapping. In some cases a metonymic correction is necessary. E.g.:
> *There is nothing new under the sun* (EP No. 104); *Every beginning (~ To begin) is difficult ~ hard ~ the hardest* (EP No. 72); *(If the) end (is) good everything (is) good* (EP No. 52); *So many men, so many minds* (EP No. 10); *Every man has his faults* (EP No. 49); *One learns until one lives ~ until death* (EP No. 31); *Never (~ Do not) put off till tomorrow what you can do today* (EP No. 11); *A true friend is known in need ~ adversity* (EP No. 26); *Better late ~ later than never* (EP No. 33); *Rather hear ~ see than speak* (EP No. 44); *He that will not work, shall not eat* (EP No. 47); *Do not do ~ wish others that you do not like to be done to you* (EP No. 57); *He that lies also steals (~ A liar is a thief)* (EP No. 75); *Like mother, like daughter ~ Like father, like son* (EP No. 21, 28)

2. If the literal meaning belongs exclusively to the non-human realm (i.e. only animals, plants and/or substances are mentioned as agents and objects, and also the qualities, actions or relations predicated upon them are of non-human character) and the text is already meaningful (semantically consistent) at its literal level, we are dealing with a sentential metaphor (in Miller's sense), i.e. the whole sentence is the metaphor and must be reconceptualized to refer to something human. E.g.:
> *A (small) spark may (often) kindle a great fire* (EP No. 15); *A barking dog never/seldom bites* (EP No. 3); *A horse has four legs and still it stumbles* (EP No. 25); *A rolling stone gathers no moss* (EP No. 14); *All cats ~ cows ~ pigs ~ sheep are alike ~ gray ~ black in the dark ~ at night* (EP No. 79); *All that glitters is not gold* (EP No. 19); *Big fish eat little fish* (EP No. 91); *Blood is not ~ will not turn water* (EP No. 41); *Constant dropping (~ Many drops) wear(s) away the stone* (EP No. 71); *Empty vessels make much ~ the most ~ greatest sound* (EP No. 23); *Fish always begin to stink ~ decay at the head* (EP No. 97); *Hawks ~ Ravens ~ ... will not pick out hawks' ~ ... eyes* (EP No. 13); *If an ass ~ beast ~ ox ~ pig ~ ... goes abroad (~ to a known seat of learning), an ass ~ beast ~ ... will return* (EP No. 87); *It's an ill ~ stupid bird that soils its own nest* (EP No. 106); *New brooms sweep clean ~ well ~ better ~ best* (EP No. 12); *No rose without a thorn* (EP No. 66); *No smoke without fire* (EP No. 1); *One scabbed sheep ~ calf ~ ... will mar ~ spoil a flock* (EP No. 56); *One swallow does not make a summer* (EP No. 4); *Still waters are ~ run deep (~ have a deep bottom)* (EP No. 78); *The apple ~ pear ~ fruit ~ cone does not fall (~ never falls) far from the tree ~ trunk ~ root* (EP No. 48); *The cat would eat fish but would not wet her feet ~ claws ~ tail* (EP No. 70); *The wolf ~ fox ~ dog may change its hair but not its nature ~ skin* (EP No. 32); *When the cat is away, the mice will play* (EP No. 17)

3. If the text is meaningful (consistent) at its literal level and represents human beings on some "lower" level of their functioning (e.g. physical, biological, physiological), and in addition some non-human constituents are involved (like plants, animals, things etc.), then the denotative "lower" functions must be projected to the "higher" level (mental, ethical, social, etc.), and a necessary share of non-human constituents must be reinterpreted as human.
On the lexical plane, the human constituent may be represented either directly (through substantives, e.g. *child*, *mother*, *carpenter*, *thief*) or indirectly (through syntactic, or so-called formulaic elements: demands and requests, for example, can be addressed only to humans, or the frequent *He who...* formula used in proverbs and other deictics can signalize the presence of a human agent or object in the text, and so on. E.g.:
> *A man drowning will catch at a straw ~ razor ~ snake ~ ...* (EP No. 81); *A tree ~ An oak is not felled at one (~ at the first) stroke* (EP No. 46); *An unbidden guest knows not where to sit* (EP No. 39); *Appetite comes ~ increases with eating* (EP No. 99); *As you make your bed so you will lie ~ sleep ~ dream ~ upon ~ on ~ in it* (EP No. 86); *As you sow, so you reap* (EP No. 2); *Better one bird ~ pigeon ~ sparrow in the hand ~ plate than two ~ ten ~ hundred in the air ~ on the branch ~ fence ~ roof* (EP No. 34); *Do not look*

a gift horse in the mouth (EP No. 5); *Do not sell the bear's skin (~ Do not drink on the bear's skin) before the bear is caught ~ killed ~ shot* (EP No. 38); *Give him an inch ~ a finger and he will take an ell ~ a hand* (EP No. 36); *He adds oil ~ straw ~ fire ~ tow ~ wood to the fire* (EP No. 68); *He buys ~ sells a cat ~ hare ~ pig in a poke* (EP No. 69); *He carries ~ draws water in the sieve* (EP No. 77); *He that climbs ~ flies ~ rises ~ sits high, falls deep* (EP No. 42); *He that greases, travels (~ Grease the wheel if you intend the cart shall go)* (EP No. 59); *He that sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind* (EP No. 103); *He who digs a pit for another, falls in himself* (EP No. 9); *If ~ When a blind leads a blind man both shall fall into a ditch* (EP No. 35); *If one (~ He who) runs after two hares, will catch neither* (EP No. 67); *In the kingdom ~ country of the blind the one eyed is king ~ ruler* (EP No. 98); *It is good ~ best ~ easy fishing in troubled waters* (EP No. 83); *Measure ~ Think two ~ three ~ seven ~ ten ~ hundred ~ many times (before you) cut once* (EP No. 62); *Nobody cannot serve (~ One cannot serve ~ It is difficult to serve) two masters* (EP No. 54); *One must howl with the wolves* (EP No. 74); *Roast pigeon ~ lark ~ sparrow ~ ... does not fly into one's mouth* (EP No. 102); *Stretch your legs (~ yourself) according to the cover (~ until the cover reaches)* (EP No. 50); *Strike when the iron is hot* (EP No. 16); *Sweep (first) before your own door ~ doorstep ~ house ~ sidewalk ~ ...* (EP No. 95); *The cobbler's wife is worst shod* (EP No. 7); *You can see a mote in another's eye but cannot see a beam in your own* (EP No. 20)

4. The need for the reconceptualization of the sentential metaphorical proverb comes from the contextual circumstances, or, in the case of context-free interpretation, from insufficient "pragmatic weight", i.e. irrelevance, of its literal meaning. In the case of nominal or predicative metaphors, on the other hand, the text itself reveals a "breaking point", i.e. a semantic contradiction or incompatibility motivating the reinterpretation of some parts of the proverb even without the presence of any context.

Another proof of the reality of such "inconsistent" or "partial" metaphors are (quite rare) proverbs, where it is ambiguous which part of the proverb should be reinterpreted, e.g. the Estonian proverb *Havi peas on rohkem kui rumala mehe peas ~ rohkem kui vaese mehe aidas* [literally: The pike has more in its head than a stupid man ~ than a poor man in his barn] can be interpreted a) as a hyperbole about the pike's outstanding mental abilities, or b) as a litotes pointing to the stupidity or material poverty of a man. Both interpretations indeed occur in the source material.

In any case, partial (nominal, predicative, or more complex) metaphors are quite common in the proverbs of all nations. In such proverbs, projections can be made from both the non-human to the human realm and vice versa.

Personification (or anthropomorphism, animation, in the more general case) is the most frequent type of this kind of projection.

Misfortunes never/seldom come alone (EP No. 6); *Fields have eyes and woods have ears ~ Walls ~ corners ~ posts have ears* (EP No. 18, 22); *The pot abuses ~ blames ridicules ~ laughs at the kettle (though both are black)* (EP No. 63); *Love is blind* (EP No. 85)

Let us provide some additional examples from Neal Norrick's book "How Proverbs Mean" (1985) where most of the proverbs are taken from his so-called "small corpus" (and all happen to start with an "F"), e.g.

Favour will as surely perish as life; Fancy flees before the wind; Familiarity breeds contempt; A fair pawn never shamed his master; Facts are stubborn things; Fear has a quick ear

Some examples of partial metaphors with projections in the other direction (i.e. depersonification, deanthropomorphism, deanimation) can be seen in the following Estonian proverbs:

Sulane on peremehe koer [The farm hand is his master's dog] *; Naine on maja lukk* [Woman is the lock of the house]; *Vaene on rikka roog* [A poor man is a rich man's food (biblical)]; *Vaene on risu rikka silmas* [A poor man is a speck in rich man's eye]

However, the proverbs obeying the "fourth rule" demonstrate that the "horizontal" traffic between semantic worlds or conceptual domains in proverbs is not arbitrarily bidirectional. Thus two more rules concerning nomination and predication should be added:

1. Predication in non-sentential metaphors can be two-directional, from both human to non-human and vice versa.

2. Nomination, on the contrary, is only unidirectional. The proverb can refer to the human being by figuratively calling him/her an animal, plant, thing or just a human being, if wanted. If, however, one wants to convey something proverbial about some real non-human object (animal, plant, thing, food, disease, natural phenomenon), this object can only be denoted by its "true", non-figurative name (a plant as a plant, an animal as an animal etc.), though anything figurative can be predicated on it.

If a proverbial phrase generally stands for the predicative component of an utterance and if I have correctly understood Nigel Barley's structuralistic slang, some very similar observations about the directional restrictions of nomination were mentioned in his work dating from the beginning of the 1970s. Even though he does not talk about the opposition "human / non-human", but instead "animate / inanimate", he mentions that: "While the proverbial phrase in Modern English allows both the transformation of Animate → Inanimate and Inanimate → Animate, I find no trace of the former semantic shift in true Modern English proverbs." (Barley 1972: 742).

From the nature of the Great Chain of Being and the four rules above, the two following corollaries can be deduced:
1. Sentential metaphorical proverbs with human source domain and non-human target domain should be very rare.
2. Metaphorical projections between different non-human conceptual domains should be very rare.

To prove or falsify the suggestions, one must rely on factual knowledge about the behaviour of proverbs in the actual paremic tradition of one or another language or culture, not on a few experiments on present-day students in laboratories of particular universities. Regretfully, there is not much information available on this kind of authentic folkloric facts.
I was able to find only a few documented Estonian and Finnish examples that falsified the above-mentioned corollaries:
(1) *Mis noormees teeb, seda vanamees rikub* [What a young man does, the old man spoils] – it refers to something like 'if it freezes in the new moon, then it thaws in the old moon'.
(2) *Hommikune külaline läheb ruttu ära, õhtune jääb* [The guest who comes in the morning leave quickly, the guest who comes in the evening stays longer] – (Russian loan?) refers to the connection between the time when it starts raining and its duration.
(3) *Tühi kott ei seisa püsti* [An empty sack doesn't stand up] – Estonian proverb referring among other things to domestic animals that lose strength and productivity if not properly fed.
(4) *Karhull on karhun penikat* [A bear has a bear's pups] – Finnish proverb, that among other things means that cold winter is followed by a cold summer.

Some of Lakoff's and Turner's interpretations may also be considered to be at best very exceptional if not altogether arbitrary: "For example, "Big thunder / little rain" might be applied to a viciously barking dog, as a way of saying that there's no reason to be afraid of him" (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 179), or further on ""Big thunder / little rain" works in pretty much the same way as the English proverb "All bark and no bite". [- - -] The only difference is "All bark and no bite" cannot be applied metaphorically to dogs, but it can be applied metaphorically to thunderstorms" (*ibid.*: 180).
The following passages by Richard Honeck (1997: 142–143) also seem purely "laboratorial": "*Too many cooks spoil the broth* [- - -] can comment critically on any situation that does not conform to the ideal. This will usually be some human activity but does not have to be. For example, we could apply "Too many cooks..." to a beaver dam that is poorly built because several families of beavers worked on it." Or: "What are the pragmatics of an ideal-confirming proverb, *Make hay while the sun shines*? [- - -] Again, this proverb, though typically applied to human activity, can be appropriately applied, say, to animals that engage in sexual intercourse during the female estrus cycle."

The obtained coarse-grained and exclusively metaphor-oriented taxonomy leaves a bundle of mutually related and entwined problems unsolved.

Rule 1, synecdoche, generalization and parallelism

Proverbs seem to have served as the principal midwife at the birth of the tripartite-structured (source + target + generic) model of metaphor in Lakoffian cognitivistics. The so-called generic-level schema is a representation of the semantic (conceptual) intersection of the two involved specific-level schemas (the source and the target), formulated in sufficiently abstract and general terms in order to cover the content of the source (i.e. the literal meaning of the proverb) as well as all actual and eventual target situations that are appropriate for using the proverb. Lakoff & Turner see the relationship of the generic and the specific as metaphorical, as the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC m e t a p h o r (further: GS-metaphor), but at the same time emphasise the unique character of the metaphor: unlike a usual metaphor, it does not relate two specific-

level schemas but "maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema" (1989: 162). Thus the GS-metaphor aims to account for a whole category of situations in the terms of one single situation, and even allows one to understand proverbs without any context being given (i.e. a specified target schema or evoking situation). The latter is considered to be a special advantage and capability of the GS-metaphor, because in this case "the generic-level schema of the source domain counts as an acceptable target" (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 165), and elsewhere Turner (1996: 27) has regarded just such cases of contextless understanding as a proof of the conceptual reality of the GS-metaphor. Hence the GS-metaphor appears to be quite close to what I in an early work (Krikmann 1974) have called the *semantic potential* of the proverb. Also here above, when building up our rules for the interpreting of proverbs, we have actually borne in mind precisely the generalized sum totals, or "figurative potentials" of the same kind, and not the mechanical sums of their meanings in certain documented actualizations.

The GS-metaphor entails some problems that are inconvenient from the point of view of this topic.

1. It does indeed bear some resemblance to ordinary metaphors – the analogy holds in both, and the so-called ontological correspondences between the components of source and target schemas are present; the direction of mapping – "the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated" – also corresponds to the general direction of metaphor-making.

On the other hand, the generic-specific relationship differs greatly from the usual metaphorical (specific-specific) relationship and is more reminiscent of metonymy, or more specifically the "logical" (category / member) subtype of synecdoche. Kövececs and Radden (1998:68) argue: "…we regard proverbs as being specific instances which metonymically, rather than metaphorically, stand for a generic-level meaning schema" (see also Rudzka-Austin 1995:239-242). Panther and Thornburg (2000:225) also mention "a metonymy that we name GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC". The triangulation rule in Tony Veale's SAPPER-model identifies the syntagmatic associativity between two concept nodes and categorical relatedness of concepts, stating that the triangulation rule is invoked "whenever two concept nodes share a common association or superclass" (e.g. see Veale 1997: 26). Cf. also Peirsman & Geeraerts (2006: 307–308) about the metonymy HYPERONYM FOR HYPONYM.

2. Whether the GS relationship is metaphorical or synecdochical, it is evidently clear that the parameters of the figurativeness and semantic generality, or abstractness, of the proverb are not independent from each other, but closely related (I share Zoltán Kanyó's claim (stated in 1981 and elsewhere) that l o g i c a l l y all proverbs are, in principle, generalized implications).

This makes critical the status of the proverbs under our "Rule 1", that is, of non-figurative maxims.

Nigel Barley views proverbial metaphors as vertical and horizontal operations on a tree-form graph, stating that "…we could usefully distinguish two forms of the manipulation of the tree-diagram [---], a) sideways transposition (metaphor); b) upward motion (generalization). [---] We are now in a position to see the relationship between the maxim (e.g. *Everything comes to him who waits*) and the proverb proper such as *The leopard cannot change his spots*. The maxim is already expressed in general terms that are to be interpreted quite literally. The proverb, on the other hand, is metaphorical and is expressed low on the axis of particularisation."

I herein completely avoid discussing the two most terrifying related issues:

1) "translatability" of our mental, non-verbal imaginations about, or mental representations of, the "actual" meanings of proverbs to some metalinguistically verbalized propositions;

2) the divisibility of lexical constituents of proverb texts to "formal" (logical, syntax-representing) and "contentful" words, and perhaps to something between the two.

In any case, our mental intuitions of the general meaning potentials (or, cognitively speaking, generic-level representations) of figurative proverbs should differ substantially from (representations of) their literal meanings, but in the case of non-figurative maxims the two representations should very probably coincide. If ordinary language is used to verbalize these representations, they should also come very close to the maxim texts themselves, and further, semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of some figurative proverbs would turn out to be identical with some non-figurative t e x t s , and so on.

Thus it is difficult to see a way to save Lakoff's and Turner's tripartite model from collapsing under the weight of non-figurative maxims that threaten to push its source, target and generic components together and make them indiscernible.

Taking things as they are does not necessarily save us from weird theoretical outputs. According to Neal Norrick (1985: 109-117), every proverb has a so-called *standard proverbial interpretation*, or SPI. SPI is

quite similar to Lakoff & Turner's generic level representation of sentential metaphorical proverbs – for example, the SPI of *The early bird catches the worm* would be 'the early agent gets the needed object'. When Lakoff & Turner qualify the GS-relationship as a metaphor, however, Norrick calls it a (species-genus) synecdoche, that is, metonymy. Thus metaphoricalness remains reserved solely for proverbs obeying the "Rule 4" in our taxonomy (see Norrick 1985: 117–128), and the important 'human / non-human' distinction remains altogether neglected.

3. The syntactic and logical structure of proverbs is also not independent from their figurativeness and generalization problems.

One of the most serious shortcomings of our metaphor-centered taxonomy of proverbs is that it is unable to deal with ultimately multiform phenomena of parallelism of which proverbs abound.

To my view, as said above, proverbs are by their logical nature generalized implications. Very often, however, that basic implicative level is superimposed with an additional higher parallelist (logically, conjunctive) level.

Parallelism in proverbs usually involves two elements or substructures, but can also evolve chains of three or more links:

America means opportunity, freedom, and power (AP: America 2); *Read much, speak little, and write less* (AP: read 4); *To work hard, live hard, die hard, and go to hell after all would be hard indeed* (AP: hard 8); *There are three kinds of people: the wills, the won'ts, and the can'ts* (AP: people 36)

Parallelism can be partial, e.g. Aristotelian structures with the "absent fourth", alias XYZ structures in Mark Turner's terminology (see e.g. 1987; 1991: 183–215; 1996: 104–108; 1998: 52–55):

Diseases are the tax on pleasures (AP: disease 4); *Experience is the teacher of fools* (AP: experience 17); *Idle hands are the devil's tools* (AP: hand 25); *Money is the source of all evil* (AP: money 42)

or the paralleled entities may be identified or connected through certain "common denominators" (properties, consequences, etc.), or defining their differences:

Actions and reactions are equal (AP: action 10); *Anger and haste hinder good counsel* (AP: anger 3); *Patience, time, and money overcome everything* (AP: patience 25); *The difference between adults and children is that adults don't ask questions* (AP: adult 2)

Parallelism can also reveal a more or less total repetition of syntactic constituents of both ~ all of the component clauses involved:

Age and marriage tame man and beast (AP: age 1); *Punishment and reward act like the bridle and spur* (AP: punishment 2); *Action without thought is like shooting without aiming* (AP: action 9); *A heart without love is a violin without strings* (AP: heart 10)

Semantically, the parallel clauses can be related contrastively:

Many acquaintances but few friends (AP: acquaintance 4); *Hatred stirs up strife, but love covers all sins* (AP: hatred 2); *Sloth makes all things difficult, but industry makes all things easy* (AP: industry 1); *The heart of a fool is in his mouth, but the mouth of a wise man is in his heart* (AP: heart 71)

or synonymously:

One swallow makes not a spring, nor one woodchuck a winter (AP: swallow); *A father's a treasure; a brother's a comfort; a friend is both* (AP: father 1); *All for one, one for all* (AP: all 5)

or ambivalently, complemantarily, or in temporal order:

Hope is a good breakfast, but it is a bad supper (AP: hope 17); *Age should think and youth should do* (AP: age 12); *Act first and think afterwards* (AP: act 2)

Various combinations can also occur on the figurative plane, e.g.

a clause of non-human reference + a clause of human reference:

*A pet person and a pet pig are the worst pets of a*ll (AP: pet); *The blacksmith's horse and the shoemaker's family always go unshod* (AP: blacksmith 2); *A whistling girl and a good fat sheep are the two best things a farmer can keep* (AP: whistling 2); *Choose neither a woman nor linen by candlelight* (AP: candlelight)

or of "elementary" human reference + a "higher-level" human reference:

Pride and the gout are seldom cured throughout (AP: pride 10); *Poverty and hunger have many apt pupils* (AP: poverty 5)

or a clearly joking, zeugma-like juxtaposition can be made:

Give neither salt nor advice till you are asked for it (AP: advice 17); *Ambition and fleas jump high* (AP: ambition 2); *Poets and pigs are appreciated only after their death* (AP: poet 3); *Happiness is like jam:*

you can't spread even a little without getting some on yourself (AP: happiness 19); *The husband is the head of the house, but the wife is the neck--and the neck moves the head* (AP: husband 15)

For a more extended and systematic survey of parallelism in Estonian proverbs, see Krikmann 1998b (Group F).

Proverbs with paralleled clauses, syntagms or concepts somehow by themselves strive to achieve generalization, but again blur the source-target-generalization relationships.

Rule 2 and the figurative status of "allegory-like" compounds of depersonification and personification

In the "Rule 2" proverbs, animals were expected to behave like animals, plants like plants, and artefacts like artefacts. However, there are a number of paremic items that reveal domain interferences": the (metaphorical) animals are ascribed clearly human characteristics and activities: they think, speak, love, blame or fear something, laugh at something, and so on. Such cases are theoretically puzzling as they can be interpreted in two different ways:

    1) as depersonifications with some "gaps" or "errors";

    2) as examples of early "proper" animism, anthropomorphism and allegory.[5]

    For example:

Animals:

Foxes, when they cannot reach the grapes, say they are not ripe (AP: fox 6); *The fox condemns the trap, not himself* (AP: fox 14) ; *Though the fox wear silk, he is still a fox* (AP: fox 18); *When the fox preaches, beware of your geese* (AP: fox 21) ; *The fox is all courtesy and all craft* (AP: courtesy 18) ; *A scalded dog thinks cold water hot* (AP: dog 32) ; *Every dog thinks her puppies are the cutest* (AP: dog 58); *Give a dog enough rope and he'll hang himself* (AP: dog 63) ; *The cat in gloves catches no mice* (AP: cat 23); *Cows prefer the grass on the other side of the fence* (AP: cow 8); *Every horse thinks his pack heaviest* (AP: horse 32); *The losing horse blames the saddle* (AP: horse 63); *An ass thinks himself a scholar because he is loaded with books* (AP: ass 5); *Every ass thinks himself worthy to stand with the king's horses* (AP: ass 11); *Every ass loves to hear himself bray* (AP: ass 10)**;** *A lazy sheep thinks its wool heavy* (AP: sheep 1)

Birds and eggs:

Crows weep for the dead lamb and then devour him (AP: crow 8); *Each old crow thinks her young are the blackest ~ Every mother crow thinks hers the whitest* (AP: crow 9); *Every duck thinks it is a swan* (AP: duck 3) ; *The owl thinks all her young ones beauties* (AP: owl 2); *Every bird likes to hear himself sing* (AP: bird 15) ; *Eggs can't teach the hen* (AP: egg 10)

Artefacts:

A good anvil does not fear the hammer (AP: anvil 1); *The anvil fears no blows* (AP: anvil 4)**;** *The old anvil laughs at many hammers ~ An old anvil laughs at many broken hammers* (AP: anvil 6; hammer 1); *The bait hides the hook* (AP: bait 4); *A new broom sweeps clean, but the old broom knows the corners* (AP: broom 2); *The kettle should not call the pot black ~ The pot can't call the kettle black ass* (AP: kettle 9)

Rule 3 and metonymy

Our taxonomy ignores the cofunctioning of metonymy with metaphor.

The metaphor, relating different domains of experience, is a paradigmatic operation. Therefore a metaphorical word, even when vanishing in polysemy, usually retains contrastivity with its original (physical or anthropomorphic) meaning and the etymological paths of its semantic developments remain considerably well traceable. The metonymy, on the contrary, makes "local" syntagmatic (though syntactically "masked"") substitutions inside one and the same domain, between contiguous conceptual and lexical units, is characteristically pale and "reduced", much less a "trope" than the metaphor, and its linguistically entrenched occurrences are much harder to detect.

The semantic status of the texts of this group is intriguingly ambivalent. On the literal level of meaning, they seem semantically "smooth" (congruous, consistent), yet their actual conceptual structure is "broken", i.e. multidomain. The ambivalent nature of such proverbs becomes evident e.g. in Permjakov's "homonymous proverbs", like *Лежачего не бьют* [Don't hit the one who is knocked down] or *Не пойман – не вор* [Not caught – not a thief] that function as metaphorical proverbs where *hitting* no longer stands only for hitting,

catching no longer for catching etc., but have originally been the historical customary rules of Russian fist-fighting or forensic practice (see Permjakov 1975: 259, 264). Here the proverb's "scenario" does not actually cross the boundaries of the human domain, but relates its "lower" and "higher" levels – and that is precisely the area where the bulk of theoretical confusion between metaphor and metonymy seems to occur.

The bulk of dilemmas between metaphor and metonymy arise precisely when the figure relates to the "lower" and "higher" levels of the human domain, particularly if the higher human properties, functions, activities and relationships are spoken of in physical, biological or physiological terms. Thus these dilemmas directly touch the area of applicability of our "Rule 3" above. If the border between the mental ~ social and "all the rest" is considered to be stronger than the border between the human and non-human, then such cases begin to look like metaphors; if the 'human / non-human' distinction is taken as superior, they begin to look like metonymies.

In some earlier variants of classifications of Estonian and Balto-Finnic proverbial figures (PS, pp. 40–41, 42–77 (Column 13); Krikmann 1998a), I tried to distinguish the proverbs under "Rule 3" into two subtypes – "materializations" and "biologizations" (i.e. more or less purely metaphorical cases) and "visualizations" ("scenarizations", "sensorizations") that involved elements of metonymy, that is, "some trope "lumps" "of local importance" whose function is to represent a conceptual structure or fragment referred to with certain perceivable components of that fragment" (Krikmann 1998a: 110)

For example, the following proverbs were qualified as ordinary metaphorical "materializations" or "biologizations":

> *Who digs a pit for another shall fall therein himself* (PS No. 1); *The shoemaker has shabby shoes, the tailor has patched trousers* (PS No. 7); *Don't spit into the well, you're going to drink from it yourself* (PS No. 9); *You don't see the beam in your own eye, but you see the mote in another's* (PS No. 11); *When you flee a wolf you find a bear in the way* (PS No. 12); *Thus the forest echoes as it is called* (PS No. 19); *Smite while the iron is hot* (PS No. 23); *As the work so the wages* (PS No. 44); *Let a beggar into the sauna and he'll want to get on the bench* (PS No. 45); *Measure seven times, cut once* (PS No. 47); *A large piece tears your mouth, a small one keeps you full* (PS No. 63); *If you knew where you'd fall, you'd put the cushion there* (PS No. 86)

The following examples were counted as metonymic visualizations, auditivizations or other "sensorizations":

> *In at one ear and out at the other* (PS No. 36); *You shut a large gate, but you can't shut a man's mouth* (PS No. 40); *One head is good, two are even better* (EP No. 15012; cf. PS No. 88); *Teach a child when it still lies crosswise on the bench…* (PS No. 103); *Better under an old man's beard than under a young man's whip* (PS No. 130); *A man returns from across the sea, but never from under the sod* (PS No. 181); *To the sleeper a pillow, to the gadabout a threshold* (PS No. 228); *Winter does not stay in the sky* [= it will snow anyway] (PS No. 232); *It's better to look into the mouth of someone laughing than someone crying* (PS No. 255); *People don't ask how long it took to do, but who did it* (PS No. 261); *Who knows a lot is asked a lot* (PS No. 262); *Help from a child: cleans one fish, eats two* [irony] (PS No. 270); *Better a mile out of the way than an inch into danger* (PS No. 285); *The one with his feet in the dirt has his mouth in the fat* (PS No. 295); *A good child has many names* (PS No. 330); *What's expensive is beautiful, what's cheap is rotten* (PS No. 347); *Send a child on an errand and you have to follow behind* (PS No. 365); *Man comes from a sniveller, but not from an empty scoffer* (PS No. 380); *Better a blister on your toe than a crease in your shoe* [about too small / too large footwear] (PS No. 394); *Better a piece of bread than a bad word* (PS No. 445); *Where his darling, there his eye; where the pain, there his hand* (PS No. 460); *The threshold is low when leaving home but high when coming back* (PS No. 462); *Big drifts in winter mean bins full of grain in autumn* (PS No. 501); *Honour a grey head, bow to a baldhead* (PS No. 571); *To bed with the hens, up with the cocks* (PA No. 575); *Who is eating has a long hand, who is beating has a short hand* (PS No. 619); *The skier gets gets sweaty, the thresher gets warm* (PS No. 641); *The hostess fattens with her nails* (PS No. 669); *A friend peels a friend's arse* (PS No. 744); *The doors to a courtroom are wide on arrival but narrow when leaving* (PS No. 788); *Who is warm under his arse* [= does not work] *is cold under his nose* [= has nothing to eat] (PS No. 810); *The fisherman thanks in the morning, the hunter in the evening* (PS No. 821); *What Juku* [≈ little Johnny] *doesn't learn Juhan* [≈ big John] *won't know* (PS No. 856)

However, the distinction proved to be too coarse and left numerous cases that were difficult to position definitively between the "purely metaphorical" and "metaphorical-metonymical" occurrences, for example:

The asker will not get a blow on the mouth, but taker will be hit on the hand (PS No. 25); *That which is on your mind is on your tongue* (PS No. 32); *When two are doing business the third must stay on the side* (PS No. 68); *The priest's sack is bottomless* (PS No. 70); *You can't catch a fish without wetting your feet nor meat* [= game?] *without moving* (PS No. 152); *What the wind has brought, water has flushed away* (PS No. 153); *Warmth won't break bones* (PS No. 184); *A dry spoon tears the mouth* (PS No. 333); *A dog comes when bid, an honest man without invitation* (PS No. 377); *Set your mouth with the sack* (PS No. 395); *Who has thirst has legs* (PS No. 562); *Who covers a patch with a patch covers a penny with a penny* (PS No. 623); *The people's pot is thick* (PS No. 654); *A bad priest preaches about himself* (PS No. 694); *The husband's bread is the tastiest, the wife's clothes the whitest* (PS No. 843); *The stingy wears a silk dress, the generous doesn't even have a pearl round his neck* (PS No. 857); *Better to bend the fat than drag the skinny behind* (PS No. 870)

Rule 4 and the diversity of personifiable targets

The potential applicability of sentential metaphoric proverbs (the eventual multitude of their targets) is given only by the linguistic competence of users; as we aimed to demonstrate above via examples from Honeck and Lakoff & Turner, the competence can be insufficient. However, *in toto* the targeted area was believed to be restricted to the human domain.

If proverbs with sentential personifications are practically non-existent, the actual diversity and fragmentarity of entities that can be personified in proverbs already becomes visible in the proverb texts themselves. The particular choice and frequency relations of different types of personifiable (anthropomorphizable) targets are obviously different in different cultures and languages. However, my preliminary impressions tend to suggest that there is a surprising lack of symmetry between the depersonification and personification of that choice of targets. The expectedly "proper" personifications, i.e. those with non-human targets (animals, plants, inanimate natural objects, meteorological phenomena), do exist in proverbs too, but occur relatively seldom. The bulk of the targets are, on the contrary, concentrated on topics belonging to or at least somehow connected with the human domain as such (like human body parts or artefacts made and used by humans), but particularly with the "higher" levels of the human domain, that is, abstract concepts like substantivated human properties, capabilities, states, events, attitudes, actions, speech and other communicative acts, including "virtues and vices", as well as time, fate and death. And, of course, personification (anthropomorphization) is practically the only way to speak of the superhuman "peak level" of the GCB.

Thus the next paradox becomes evident: though concordantly accepted as a trope, or mental operation, of the paradigmatic, i.e. metaphorical kind, the personification in many aspects of its realization comes close to metonymy (and hence is also subjected to all of the above-mentioned theoretical disputes connected with it).

In Krikmann 1998a: 114–117, I argued the following kinds of targets to be particularly characteristic of Balto-Finnic (included Estonian) proverbs:
    a) meteorological and other natural phenomena and objects;
    b) food and clothing;
    c) time, time units, calendar dates;
    d) various social phenomena (debt, profession);
    e) somatic referents (heart, eye, stomach, feet);
    f) the word, speech, speech acts ('If', (kind) word, promise);
    g) various troubles, defective conditions, such as hunger, accidents etc.;
    h) certain specific substantivized human activities and various spiritual, ethical or other properties (carelessness, work, hate, envy, etc.).

By and large, the same types of targets appear also to be frequent in American proverbs:
Animals:
    A dog is man's best friend (AP: dog 13); *The cat is a good friend, but she scratches* (AP: cat 24)
Body parts, blood, voice:
    Empty heads talk the loudest (AP: head 13); *The eye is not satisfied with seeing* (AP: eye 29); *The right hand is slave to the left* (AP: hand 53); *The heart has eyes that the brain knows nothing of* (AP: heart 66); *What the heart thinks, the tongue speaks* (AP: heart 83); *A man's best friend is his ten fingers* (AP: finger 32); *Blood asks blood, and death must death requite* (AP: blood 2); *Blood will tell* (AP: blood 7); *The blood remembers what the mind has never known* (AP: blood 11); *The voice is the guardian of the mind*

(AP: voice 5)

Alcohol, drinks; food:

Wine is a mocker (AP: wine 17); *Wine is the discoverer of secrets* (AP: wine 18); *Whiskey – a good servant but a bad master* (AP: whiskey 4); *A man takes a drink, the drink takes a drink, the drink takes the man* (AP: drink 1)**;** *Candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker* (AP: candy)

Money, gold:

Make money your servant, not your master (AP: money 16); *Money greases the axle* (AP: money 29); *Money greases the machine in the long run* (AP: money 30); *Money talks (but all it says is goodbye)* (AP: money 60); *Money will be a slave or a master* (AP: money 62); *A coin is the best friend* (AP: coin); *Your best friend is your dollar* (AP: dollar 11); *Two pennies will creep together* (AP: penny 19); *Gold is an unseen tyrant* (AP: gold 9); *Gold rules the world* (AP: gold 18); *When gold speaks, everyone is silent* (AP: gold 28)

Various artefacts:

The cards beat all the players, be they ever so skillful (AP: cards 6); *Little axe cuts down big tree* (AP: axe 5); *A good book is a great friend ~ the best companion* (AP: book 7); *Books are our cheapest friends* (AP: book 16)**;** *Old books are old friends* (AP: book 27); *Clothes speak for men, making or closing their opportunities* (AP: clothes 4); *Good clothes open all doors* (AP: clothes 9); *A sealed door invites a thief* (AP: door 3); *Doors have eyes and walls have ears* (AP: door 7)

Fire, flame:

Fire is a good servant but a bad master (AP: fire 21); *Old flame never dies* (AP: flame 2)

Sun:

The sun never repents of the good he does, nor does he ever demand a recompense (AP: sun 18)

Seasons of the year, months:

Winter comes but once a year, and when it comes, it brings the doctor good cheer (AP: winter 3); *Winter eats what summer gets* (AP: winter 8); *April borrows three days of March, and they are ill* (AP: April 2); *Sharp April kills the pig* (AP: April 8)**;** *Till April is dead, change not a thread* (AP: April 9); *When April blows his horn, it's good for hay and corn* (AP: April 11)

Time, day, today:

Kill time and time will kill you (AP: time 23); *Take time by the forelock* (AP: time 35); *Time and tide wait for no man* (AP: time 51); *Time brings everything to light* (AP: time 54); *Time changes everything* (AP: time 57); *Time changes the oak into a coffin* (AP: time 58); *Time devours all things* (AP: time 60); *Time erases all sorrows* (AP: time 62); *Time has a wallet* (AP: time 67); *Time heals all wounds ~ cures all ills* (AP: time 68); *Time is a cunning workman* (AP: time 69); *Time is a true friend to sorrow* (AP: time 74); *Time is the best doctor* (AP: time 80); *Time is the best teacher* (AP: time 81); *Time is the rider that breaks youth* (AP: time 83); *Time marches on* (AP: time 88); *Time will tell* (AP: time 98); *Time works for those who work* (AP: time 99); *Time works wonders* (AP: time 100); *Today is yesterday's pupil* (AP: today 11); *The day has but one eye; the night has a thousand* (AP: day 36); *What a day may bring a day may take away* (AP: 45)

Fortune, faith:

Fortune always leaves one door open in disasters (AP: fortune 8); *Fortune and misfortune are next-door neighbors* (AP: fortune 9); *Fortune favors fools* (AP: fortune 14); *Fortune favors the brave ~ the bold* (AP: fortune 15); *Fortune helps them that help themselves* (AP: fortune 16); *Fortune is fickle* (AP: fortune 18); *Fortune is the companion of virtue* (AP: fortune 22); *Fortune knocks once at every door* (AP: fortune 24); *If fortune smiles, who doesn't – if fortune doesn't, who does?* (AP: fortune 29); *When fortune frowns, friends are few* (AP: fortune 32); *When fortune knocks, open the door* (AP: fortune 33); *When fortune smiles, embrace her* (AP: fortune 34); *When fortune smiles, take the advantage* (AP: fortune 35); *You can't overfill fortune's sacks* (AP: fortune 37); *Faith laughs at impossibilities* (AP: faith 9)

History, age, end:

History teaches by example (AP: history 4); *Age writes in the sand* (AP: age 13)**;** *The warnings of age are the weapons of youth* (AP: 19); *The end crowns all* (AP: end 7)**;** *The end justifies the means* (AP: end 8)

Death:

Death defies the doctor (AP: 5); *Death fiddles and we dance* (AP: 7); *Death pays all debts* (AP: 19); *Death rides with the drinking driver* (AP: 20)

Personifications of substantivated human properties, capabilities, (emotional, deficiency, etc.) states, events, attitudes, actions, speech and other communicative acts.

Mieder's collection of American proverbs, which on the one hand reveals a strong historical substrate of classical (thus often literary) European proverbs, and on the other includes a notably high proportion of sayings of modern, more precisely American origin, is particularly rich in such personifications.

Mother, father; daughter, son; sister, brother; parent, child, and other kinship terms:

Absence is the mother of disillusion (AP: absence 4); *Accident is the mother of invention* (AP: accident 3); *Attention is the mother of memory* (AP: attention 1); *Borrowing is the mother of trouble* (AP: borrowing 2); *Diligence is the mother of good luck ~ fortune* (AP: diligence 4); *Experience is the mother of knowledge* (AP: experience 14); *Experience is the mother of science* (AP: experience 15); *Frugality is the mother of all the virtues* (AP: frugality 2); *Idleness is the mother of evil ~ mischief ~ all the vices* (AP: idleness 12); *Ignorance is the mother of conceit* (AP: ignorance 14); *Ignorance is the mother of superstition* (AP: ignorance 15); *Necessity is the mother of invention* (AP: 9); *Patience is the mother of virtue* (AP: patience 20); *Politics is the mother of graft* (AP: politics 4); *Poverty is the mother of all the arts* (AP: poverty 16); *Poverty is the mother of invention* (AP: poverty 18); *Repetition is the mother of learning ~ skill* (AP: repetition); *Sloth is the mother of poverty* (AP: sloth 2); *Sloth is the mother of vice* (AP: sloth 3); *Practical utility is the mother of justice and equity* (AP: utility 1); *Want is the mother of industry* (AP: want 5); *Charity is the father of sacrifice* (AP: charity 8); *Continuity is the father of success* (AP: continuity); *Dissatisfaction is the father of ambition* (AP: dissatisfaction); *Fear is the father of cruelty* (AP: fear 11); *Ignorance is the father of crime* (AP: ignorance 13); *The wish is father of the thought* (AP: wish 3); *Experience is the father of wisdom and memory the mother* (AP: experience 13); *Poverty is the mother of crime; want of sense is the father* (AP: poverty 17); *Gambling is the son of avarice, the brother of iniquity, and the father of mischief* (AP: gambling 2); *Idleness is hunger's mother, and of theft it is full brother* (AP: idleness 6); *Admiration is the daughter of ignorance* (AP: admiration); *All arts are brothers; each is a light to others* (AP: art 1); *Pity is akin to love* (AP: pity 4); *Poverty has no kin* (AP: poverty 11); *Proverbs are the daughters of daily experience* (AP: proverb 2); *Truth is the daughter of time* (AP: truth 63); *Zeal without knowledge is the sister of folly* (AP: zeal 5); *Accident is commonly the parent of disorder* (AP: accident 2); *Adversity is the parent of virtue* (AP: adversity 7); *Caution is the parent of safety* (AP: caution 3); *Wise distrust is the parent of security* (AP: distrust); *Industry is the parent of success* (AP: industry 6); *Novelty is the great parent of pleasure* (AP: novelty 2); *Caution is the eldest child of wisdom* (AP: caution 3 var.); *Eloquence is the child of knowledge* (AP: eloquence 2); *Glory is the fair child of peril* (AP: glory 2); *Intolerance is the child of ignorance* (AP: intolerance); *Prejudice is the child of ignorance* (AP: prejudice 5); *Success is the child of audacity* (AP: success 29)

Friend, enemy:

Adversity has no friends (AP: adversity 4); *Calamity is often a friend in disguise* (AP: calamity 3); *Hunger knows no friend* (AP: hunger 9); *Idleness and lust are bosom friends* (AP: idleness 1); *Good morals and good manners are sworn friends* (AP: morals 1); *Silence is a friend that betrays no man* (AP: silence 6); *Action is worry's worst enemy* (AP: action 7); *Affectation is a greater enemy to the face than small pox* (AP: affectation 2); *Anger is a sworn enemy* (AP: anger 12); *Art has no enemy but ignorance* (AP: art 5); *Your ignorance is your worst enemy* (AP: ignorance 27); *Passion is ever the enemy of truth* (AP: passion 9); *Art and science have no enemies but those who are ignorant* (AP: art 3); *Envy is the basest of all enemies* (AP: envy 8); *Absence is love's foe: far from the eyes, far from the heart* (AP: absence 3)

Companion, neighbour:

Beauty and folly are old companions (AP: beauty 1); *Cheerfulness, helpfulness, and honesty are fine, good companions to take with you through life* (AP: cheerfulness 1); *Best companions are innocence and health* (AP: companion 6); *No companion can be better for us than gratitude in the darkness* (AP: companion 8); *An evil conscience is the most unquiet companion* (AP: conscience 11); *Insensibility is the companion of drunkenness* (AP: insensibility); *My own thoughts are my companions* (AP: thought 11); *Danger is next neighbor to security* (AP: danger 6); *Joy and sorrow are next-door neighbors* (AP: joy 6)

Mistress; master, slave:

Art is a jealous mistress (AP: art 8); *Diligence is the mistress of success* (AP: diligence 3); *Love is the master of all arts* (AP: love 58); *Necessity is a hard master* (AP: necessity 7); *Want will be your master* (AP: want 8); *Debt is a hard taskmaster* (AP: debt 4); *While the word is yet unspoken, you are master of it; when once it is spoken, it is master of you* (AP: word 61); *Custom is a master that makes a slave of*

reason (AP: custom 6)
Thief:
Care is beauty's thief (AP: care 6); *Opportunity is the thief of virtue* (AP: opportunity 14); *Procrastination is the thief of time* (AP: procrastination 2); *Punctuality is the thief of time* (AP: punctuality 5)
Teacher, pupil; guide:
Experience is a dear teacher (AP: experience 7); *Mistakes are often the best teachers* (AP: mistake 8); *Necessity is a good teacher* (AP: necessity 6); *Poverty and hunger have many apt pupils* (AP: poverty 5); *Custom is the great guide* (AP: custom 10); *Let your conscience be your guide* (AP: conscience 18)
Various substantives:
A bad conscience is an accuser, judge, witness, and hangman (AP: conscience 1); *Inconsistency is the attendant of a weak mind* (AP: inconsistency 1); *Punishment is a close attendant to guilt* (AP: punishment 5); *Beauty is a good client* (AP: beauty 8); *Hunger makes the best cook* (AP: hunger 12); *Common sense is genius dressed in its working clothes* (AP: common sense 3); *Ugliness is the guardian of women* (AP: ugliness); *Ignorance is an ungrateful guest* (AP: ignorance 8); *Fear is a great inventor* (AP: fear 8); *Caution is the best keeper of a castle* (AP: caution 1); *Hunger is a great leveler* (AP: hunger 4); *Hope is the nurse of misery* (AP: hope 23); *Kindness is a great peacemaker* (AP: kindness 13); *Silence is a great peacemaker* (AP: silence 7); *Our doubts are traitors* (AP: doubt 5); *Custom is a tyrant* (AP: custom 8); *Memory is the watchman of the brain* (AP: memory 2); *Friendship is a magic weaver* (AP: friendship 5)
Verbs – speaking and other communicative acts:
Actions speak ~ lie louder than words (AP: action 14); *Good actions speak for themselves; they need no tin horn* (AP: action 20); *Great actions speak great minds* (AP: action 21); *Anger and love give bad counsel* (AP: anger 4); *Light cares speak; great ones are dumb* (AP: care 13); *Deeds speak louder than words* (AP: deed 12); *Knowledge talks lowly; ignorance talks loudly* (AP: knowledge 29); *Sickness tells us what we are* (AP: sickness 3); *Light sorrows speak; great ones are dumb* (AP: sorrow 4); *Truth gives a short answer, but lies go round about* (AP: truth 51); *Let your will roar when your power can but whisper* (AP: will 4); *Wisdom doesn't always speak in Greek and Latin* (AP: wisdom 15); *Conduct has the loudest tongue* (AP: conduct 1)
Dying, death; killing:
Anger dies quickly in a good man (AP: anger 6); *Care killed the cat* (AP: care 7); *Hope dies only when you die* (AP: hope 14); *Love never dies of starvation, but often of indigestion* (AP: love 77); *Prettiness dies quickly* (AP: prettiness); *Vanity dies hard* (AP: vanity 4); *Virtue dies at twelve o'clock at night* (AP: virtue 22); *Many good purposes lie in the churchyard* (AP: purpose 3); *Secrets are never long-lived* (AP: secret 13); *Truth never grows old* (AP: truth 72); *Virtue never grows old* (AP: virtue 34); *A bad ~ good deed never dies* (AP: deed 1); *Greed killed the wolf* (AP: greed 2)
Breeding:
Candor breeds hatred (AP: candor 1); *Delay breeds loss* (AP: delay 2); *Greed breeds contempt* (AP: greed 1); *Sloth breeds poverty* (AP: sloth 1); *Violence breeds hatred, and hatred dissension* (AP: violence 2)
Teaching, nursing:
Example teaches more than precept (AP: example 3); *Experience teaches slowly and at the cost of mistakes* (AP: experience 18); *Experience teaches wisdom unto fools* (AP: experience 19); *Every failure teaches a man something, if he will learn* (AP: failure 2); *Don't nurse your sorrows* (AP: sorrow 1)
Sleeping, waking:
Affairs sleep soundly when fortune is present (AP: affair 1); *When sorrow is asleep, wake it not* (AP: sorrow 16)
Eating, drinking, dining, gnawing etc.:
Hunger eats through stone walls and builds barricades (AP: hunger 2); *Malice drinks its own poison* (AP: malice 1); *Pride breakfasted with plenty, dined with poverty, and supped with infamy* (AP: pride 11); *Pride that dines on vanity sups on contempt* (AP: pride 26); *Inaction gnaws the heartstrings* (AP: inaction)
Seeing, sight, blind:
Envy is blind (AP: envy 6); *Hatred is blind, as well as love* (AP: hatred 1); *Love is blind ~ Love is blind, deaf, and speechless* (AP: love 51); *Mother love is blind* (AP: love 85); *Fear has many eyes* (AP: fear 5); *Love sees no faults* (AP: love 79); *Malice has a sharp sight and a strong memory* (AP: malice 2)

Knowing:

Love knows no boundaries (AP: love 65); *Love knows no jealousy* (AP: love 66); *Love knows no obstacles and grows with them* (AP: love 67); *Love knows no season* (AP: love 68); *Vice knows she's ugly, so puts on her mask* (AP: vice 7)

Curing:

Love cures coquetry (AP: love 32); *Love cures the very wound it makes* (AP: love 33)

Coming, knocking, entering, departing:

When poverty comes in the door, love flies out the window (AP: poverty 32); *A good deed comes back a thousand fold* (AP: deed 3); *When want comes in at the door, love flies out of the window ~ When poverty comes in at the door, love goes up the chimney* (AP: love 102); *If opportunity knocks, let her in* (AP: opportunity 4); *Opportunity doesn't knock the door down* (AP: opportunity 12); *Opportunity knocks but once ~ Opportunity knocks but once, but temptation hammers incessantly* (AP: opportunity 16); *Opportunity knocks for every man, but a woman gets a ring* (AP: opportunity 17); *Opportunity never knocks for persons not worth a rap* (AP: opportunity 19); *When passion enters in at the foregate, wisdom goes out at the postern* (AP: passion 16); *Misfortune arrives on horseback but departs on foot* (AP: misfortune 3)

Going (together), walking, roaming, running, fleeing, creeping, traveling, driving, tripping, following, flying etc.:

Gratitude and greed do not go together (AP: gratitude 2); *Pride and poverty go hand in hand* (AP: pride 9); *Idleness goes in rags* (AP: idleness 4); *Pride goes before, and shame follows after* (AP: pride 15); *A lie can go a mile before the truth can put its boots on* (AP: lie 3); *Love goes where it's sent* (AP: love 36); *Pride goes forth on horseback grand and gay, and comes back on foot and begs its way* (AP: pride 16); *Beauty walks while angels sleep* (AP: beauty 33); *Folly and beauty walk hand in hand* (AP: folly 2); *Virtue would not go far if a little vanity walked not with it* (AP: vanity 7); *Ever let the fancy roam; pleasure never is at home* (AP: fancy 1); *Fancy runs most furiously when a guilty conscience drives it* (AP: fancy 4); *A lie runs until it is overtaken by the truth* (AP: lie 8); *Flee the pleasure that will bite tomorrow* (AP: pleasure 4); *Love will creep where it cannot go* (AP: love 82); *Laziness travels so slow that poverty overtakes him* (AP: laziness 4); *A lie can travel round the world while the truth is tieing up its shoestrings* (AP: lie 4); *If passion drives, let reason hold the reins* (AP: passion 7); *Haste may trip up its own heels* (AP: haste 5); *Fly pleasure and it will follow you* (AP: pleasure 5); *Sorrow treads upon the heels of mirth* (AP: sorrow 13); *A lie stands on one leg, truth on two ~ A lie only runs on one leg* (AP: lie 9)

Personifications of words and expressions:

Blame-all and praise-all are two blockheads (AP: blame-all); *Take-it-easy and live-long are brothers* (AP: brother 6); *Bury can't and you'll find will* (AP: can 1); *Can't died in the cornfield ~ poorhouse* (AP: can 2); *Can't is a liar* (AP: can 3); *Can't is a sluggard, too lazy to work* (AP: can 4); *Can't is un-American* (AP: can 5); *Can't never could ~ Can't never did anything; I don't want to will do less ~ I can't never did anything; I'll try has done wonders* (AP: can 6); *Can't was a coward* (AP: can 7); *The three doctors Diet, Quiet, and Temperance are the best physicians* (AP: doctor 17); *It is better to be a has-been than a never-was* (AP: has-been); *"If" is a big stiff* (AP: if 2)

Hitherto we used as the framework model of our observations the restricted variant of the GCB that Lakoff & Turner called basic. Historically, though, the basic was just the version that Lakoff &Turner called extended and which also included the supernatural level of gods, demons, angels, ghosts, etc. The variety of personifiable entities also compels us to include this superhuman domain in our observations as well, because proverbs do actually contain words like *God*, *devil*, *angel*, etc., and so we have to deal with their rhetorical nature. The link between the human and superhuman is also one of the most important problems arising from the GCB.

Perhaps the well-known "technical" synonyms for God in many languages (for instance English *King*, *Lord*, German *Herr*, Finnish *Herra*, Estonian *Is(s)and*, Russian *Господь*, etc., etc.) are also etymological descendants of the GCB, i.e. the names of representatives of the highest rank of various degrees of social communities: State → Feudal domain → Family, domestic household. Of course these could be considered as phenomena of anthropomorphism.

In proverbs both God and the devil are completely anthropomorphic.

God is omnipotent; he sees and knows everything, and his will governs everything. Nothing is accidental for him, though you may not notice his presence at once: God's mill grinds slowly, but it grinds exceedingly fine. Therefore fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

God is generous, he always opens his hand himself and loves the cheerful giver, he tempers the wind to the shorn lamb and builds a nest for the blind bird, he fits your back to your burden and if you have a mouth, God will help to feed it.

One should, however, not place all one's hopes in God alone: God sends every bird its food, but he does not throw it into the nest; he promises a safe landing, but not a calm passage. God helps only those who help themselves, he never helps him who sits on his ass and waits, therefore you must trust in God and do something, pray to God, but keep hammering.

God does not help haphazardly, and only puts food into clean hands. And even if you are bad, God will grip you, but not choke you.

Heaven is often just a metonymy for God: Heaven is above all and will mend all. Heaven helps those that help themselves, keeps those who keep themselves and protects the good man. The will of heaven is mysterious and not easily discovered.

In any case, it is not easy to get to heaven: it is a place prepared for those prepared for it. Some people are too mean for heaven and too good for hell. Not everybody who talks about heaven will go there, and those who know all about heaven seldom get there.

As the Act of Creation originated from good intentions, the devil has no place in the model of GCB, despite its abundant occurrence in practically all folklores and religions. In proverbs and phraseology the devil is, as a rule, an anthropomorphized axiological antipode of God who often tries to spoil God's good deeds:

Where God has a church, the devil has a chapel (AP: God 26); *The devil hawks his wares within the house of God* (AP: devil 19); *God sends meat, and the devil sends cooks* (AP: God)

The figure of the devil in proverbs is particularly vivid and colourful.

The devil speaks, drinks and eats. Sarcasm is his language and poetry is his drink.

The devil preys on people, setting nets and traps for them, like bad companies and alcohol; gold is his fishhook, women are his nets and a sweet voice is often a devil's arrow that reaches the heart; discouragement is another of his most valuable tools. The devil is restless in his work; he never sleeps, is never idle; he is master of all the arts.

One must avoid making deals with the devil: if you give him an inch he will take an ell, and he that takes the devil into his boat must carry him over the sound. It's hard to keep out the devil, but it is worse to drive him out. When the devil has already come, it is too late to pray. Even speaking of the devil is dangerous: do it and he will appear. You must be very cautious with the devil: when fortune knocks at your door, the devil accompanies it.

The devil must be fought back with his own tools, or with fire. You also can kill the devil by kindness, but actually one has few chances of success, and therefore it is reasonable to give him his dues, because he will get them anyway.

Where the devil cannot go himself, he sends his evil grandmother or credulous children.

However, the devil is not as black as he is painted. He has a bizarre, malicious sense of humour: he laughs when he sees the biter bitten or when denominations fight. He is even in a sense just, e.g. hates a coward and places pillows for a drunken man to fall on.

The devil lives in hell.

The devil uses idle minds as his workshop and idle hands as his tools.

Hell is populated with the victims of harmless amusements; the road to hell is wide and paved with good intentions and its streets are paved with promises; there is a large store full of good intentions and sorry people. Despite that, it is never totally full, there is always room for sinful newcomers, like thieves, liars, lawyers etc. [y]

When we are told something about God or godS or supernatural beings in general, the problem "metaphor or metonymy?" arises very often.

It seems that the ordinary contemporary person (I daren't say anything about postmodern persons) tends to understand many metaphor-formed expressions about God or Jesus metonymically, for example: *God is love* comes to mean 'God is somehow connected with love, represents love, loves us', etc., or the famous *I am the way and the truth and the life* (John 14:6) comes to mean something like 'I am the one who s h o w s you the right way and s p e a k s truth and g i v e s you eternal life'.

I have elsewhere touched on the peculiar group of calendar proverbs which I have termed "saint-personifications", for instance the Estonian saying about the degrees of cabbage mellowing, *Laurits laotab lehti, Pärtel pöörab päid* [Lawrence spreads the leaves, Bartholomew turns the heads], or *Kadri hakkab kusele, aga Andres pistab pulga ette* [Catherine begins pissing, but Andrew stops her with a stick], *Jaan viskab esimese jahe kivi vette, Jaak teise ja Mihkel kolmanda* [John drops the first cold stone in the water, Jacob drops the second and Michael the third], and a great number of others.

In that earlier "proverb period" of my life I have also often and endlessly pondered the paradoxical question: do proverbs that speak of God have a profoundly different "figurative structure" for a religious person and for a non-believer.

As a matter of fact, the problem is not in the presence / absence of some "materialized" image in the figurative part of the proverb. Take, for instance, the saying *God's mills grind slowly but exceedingly fine* – hardly any reasonable believer would think that God has some ontologically real buildings and equipments like mills somewhere. Some Estonian and Finnish proverbs and expressions expose God not only anthropomorphically, but also extremely naturalistically:

> *Jummal tulõ-õi suuhtõ sitalõ ~ Jumal ei situ suhu ega Jeesus ei kata ihu* [God doesn't come and shit in one's mouth ~ God doesn't shit in one's mouth and Jesus doesn't cover one's body]; *Mine Jumala perset peksma ~ Jumala perse olgu peksamatta* [Go and beat God's ass ~ Make sure God's ass is not beaten];
> Cf. also Finnish: *Jumalan perse paukkuu* (about thunder) [God's ass is shooting (thunder claps)][6]

The problem is instead in the presence / absence of the ontologically real fact of intentionality in the readings of these proverbs, that is, in the presence / absence of the act of personification therein. It is evident that in the cognitive theory of metaphor, the general formula for personification is EVENTS ARE ACTIONS. In the minds of ordinary people, however, human beings are the only proper agents. In what sense we can speak of timeless, spaceless and bodiless almighty spiritual beings as agents is for me a total theological mystery. For non-believers these proverbs most likely sound like propositions about events, and NOT actions – *God* will be understood as a natural, material causality, fate, good or bad luck, or the like – that is, metonymically again.[7]

6. IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION: DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN METAPHOR AND TRUTH

A couple of centuries ago the "division of labour" between philosophy and science on the one hand and rhetoric and poetry on the other, was altogether different (and not as clear) as it is nowadays. In *The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An Encyclopaedia* (2000), one can find Chapter 63 MACROCOSM / MICROCOSM, written by John Henry from the University of Edinburgh. Even in the 17th century it was seriously believed that there was a systematic analogy between man (or "microcosm") and the universe as a whole (or the "macrocosm"). It was also believed that there existed a real ontological analogy between the organisation of the human body and human society, the society and the "macrososm", and so on. Henry (p 344) writes:

> "The structure and organization of man, and even his life processes, corresponded, therefore, to the structure, organization and natural processes of the world. As Walter Raleigh (1552–1618) put it in his *History of the World* (1614):
> His blood, which disperseth itself by the branches of veins through all the body, may be resembled to those waters which are carried by brooks and rivers over all the earth, his breath to the air, his natural heat to the inclosed warmth which the earth hath in itself…the hairs of man's body, which adorns or overshadows it, to the grass which covereth the upper face and skin of the earth…. Our determinations to the light wandering and unstable clouds, carried everywhere with uncertain winds, our eyes to the light of the sun and the moon, and the beauty of our youth to the flowers of the spring which in a very short time or with the sun's heat dry up and wither away, or the fierce puffs of wind blow them from the stalks."

And further, p 347:

> "One of the most famous examples of the use of the analogy between the body and the body politic in the history of science is to be found in the works of William Harvey (1578-1657), discoverer of the circulation of the blood. The first announcement of his discovery of blood circulation, in his *On the Motion of the Heart and Blood* (1628), drew upon entirely traditional analogies straight from the standard view of the Great Chain of Being and its correspondences. The heart was "the sun of the microcosm," the sun was "the heart of the world," and King Charles I (ruled 1625-49), to whom the book was dedicated, was "the sun of his microcosm, the heart of his commonwealth.""

And so on and so on.

However, only a couple of years ago Alexander Wendt (2004) argued that states are persons in an entirely direct (philosophical, ontological) sense, because all basic criteria for defining personality or agency hold true for them too: they are intentional, they are organisms (sic!), and they possess consciousness.

From here, direct links reach to the general vivid, sharp and serious disputes around the very concepts of intentionality and consciousness, including the notorious qualia, etc. – about their contentfulness, the limits on their applicability to "lower" domains, for example, animal behaviour, but in so-called biosemiotics also to the plant kingdom, and also to social groups (via the notion of so-called collective intentionality), and so on.

Or take the meaning of the expression *to be awake*, for instance. Our common sense understanding of it is simple: if we do not sleep physiologically, we are awake in the literal sense, and all of the mental "second order awakenings" (so-called religious experiences, states of transfiguration and inspiration, etc.) are counted as metaphors. Ernst F. Schumacher, however, in his *A Guide for the Perplexed*, aims to convince us that the last type of spiritual awakening is ontologically real, whereas our usual, everyday state of consciousness should instead be qualified as sleeping:

> When we are acting or thinking or feeling mechanically, like a programmed computer or any other machine, we are obviously not awake in this [real] sense, and we are doing, thinking or feeling things that we have not ourselves freely chosen to do, think or feel. [- - -] When we are not awake in our attention, we are certainly not self-aware and therefore not fully human; we are likely to act helplessly in accordance with uncontrolled inner drives or outer compulsions, like animals. [- - -] traditional wisdom, including all the great religions, as mentioned before, has always described itself as 'The Way' and give some kind of awakening as the goal. Buddhism has been called the 'Doctrine of Awakening'. Throughout the New Testament, people are admonished to stay awake, to watch, not to fall asleep." (Schumacher 1977: 80–81)

Finally I would like to say some words about the phenomenon of the "spatialization of everything", which seems to be a hot topic of discussion in contemporary semiotics and elsewhere.

As Eve Sweetser (1990) and others have demonstrated, practically all lexical devices for speaking about mental and abstract things prove to be descended – overtly or at least etymologically – from the domain of the physical world. In his seminal book *Body in the Mind* (1987), Mark Johnson has investigated two main types of Gestalts that constitute the basis of our metaphorical thinking and speaking – SPACE and FORCE. Many abstract concepts are not explicitly represented in the GCB model – time and space, generic and specific, causality, and so on. But the GCB model itself is an excellent example of the "spatialization of everything". It is a hierarchy with vertical and horizontal dimensions. It is a unity of continuity and discreteness. And what is especially intriguing is that it conspicuously demonstrates the axiological markedness of space, particularly its vertical dimension, which is deeply rooted in the human mind in general. High and up are good, whereas low and down are bad. Below the "zero point", however, superficial is bad, deep is good, and so forth.

The axiological aspects of existence have so far been relatively abandoned topics in the theory of metaphor. I am, however, deeply convinced that they are worthy of investigation and promise auspicious results.

Notes

1. Lovejoy (1936: 59) argued that
   "through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science and, indeed, most educated men, were to accept without question the conception of the universe as a "Great Chain of Being," composed of an immense, or -- by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity -- of an infinite number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through "every possible" grade up to the ens perfectissimum -- or, in a somewhat more orthodox version, to the highest possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite -- every one of them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it by the "least possible" degree of difference."

2. From Encyclopædia Britannica Online:
   Great Chain of Being
   also called Chain Of Being, conception of the nature of the universe that had a pervasive influence on Western thought, particularly through the ancient Greek Neoplatonists and derivative philosophies during the European Renaissance and the 17th and early 18th centuries. The term denotes three general features of the universe: plenitude, continuity, and gradation. The principle of plenitude states that the universe is "full," exhibiting the maximal diversity of kinds of existences; everything possible (*i.e.,* not self-contradictory) is actual. The principle of continuity asserts that the universe is composed of an infinite series of forms, each of which shares with its neighbour at least one attribute. According to the principle of

linear gradation, this series ranges in hierarchical order from the barest type of existence to the *ens perfectissimum,* or God.

The idea of the chain of being was first systematized by the Neoplatonist Plotinus, though the component concepts were derived from Plato and Aristotle. Plato's "idea of the good" in the *Republic,* eternal, immutable, ineffable, perfect, the universal object of desire, is fused with the demiurge of the *Timaeus,* who constructed the world of becoming because "he was good, and in one that is good no envy of anything else ever arises." Aristotle introduced a definition of the continuum and pointed out various graded scales of existence. Thus, in the words of Plotinus, in his *Enneads,* "The one is perfect because it seeks for nothing, and possesses nothing, and has need of nothing; and being perfect, it overflows, and thus its superabundance produces an Other." This generation of the many from the one must continue until all possible varieties of being in the descending series are realized.

The scale of being served Plotinus and many later writers as an explanation of the existence of evil in the sense of lack of some good. It also offered an argument for optimism; since all beings other than the *ens perfectissimum* are to some degree imperfect or evil, and since the goodness of the universe as a whole consists in its fullness, the best possible world will be one that contains the greatest possible variety of beings and so all possible evils. The notion died out in the 19th century but was given renewed currency in the 20th by Arthur O. Lovejoy (*The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea,* 1936).

3. See, e.g., Lynskey (1945); Boas (1948); Randall (1963); Mazzeo (1972); Hintikka (1975/76); Duffin (1980); Gram & Martin (1980); Beer (1986); Gordon-Bournique (1987); Mahoney (1987); Oakley (1987); Wilson (1987); Kelley (1990); Hahlweg (1991), and many others.

4. Here is a fragment of Sir John Denham's (1615–1659? 1669?) poem entitled *Thames River*:
   O, could I flow like thee! and make thy stream
   My great example, as it is my theme;
   Though deep yet clear, though gentle yet not dull;
   Strong without rage, without o'erflowing full.
   (Quoted and analyzed in I. A. Richards (1936: 121))
   Generally, the poet's mind is the target, and the river is the vehicle. In the two last lines, however, these planes of meaning begin to alternate and sway to and fro. In the third line, *deep* and *clean* are literally instead attributes of the river (i.e. the vehicle), and the author's mind continues to be the target. Then, however, the oscillation between the two planes begins. In *though gentle, but not dull* the roles of these planes are evidently changed – here the river is spoken about rather in terms of the human mind. Richards says that here the river is being personified, as well as in the following clause *strong without rage*. That is certainly true, but the process seems to be even more nuanced. Metaphors evidently distinguish different levels of "mind", and, folk-theoretically speaking, the "intellectual mind" seems to be, to say, more distant from the flesh level, and the "emotional mind" closer to it. Thus *strong without rage* as a whole seems to have a more complicated and multilevel structure. The word *strong* is actually indefinite, in the sense that it certainly denotes the physical level of something, but it is impossible to determine whether it is more densely associated with river or with human being. Thus the clause *strong without rage* actually becomes structurally altogether ambiguous – both the interpretation the *Thames is strong without rage* (i.e. the personification of the river) and another interpretation *My spirit ~ intellect is strong without rage* (i.e. the personification of the author and his mind) seem equally acceptable. And finally, in the very last clause, *without o'erflowing full*, the metaphor returns to its initial direction – depersonification – displaying some of the features of the poet's mind as the properties of a river.

5. Analogous dualities can evidently also occur in the case of personifications. Neal Norrck (1985: 120), for example, when interpreting the English proverb *Fancy may bolt bran and think it flour* as 'Anthropomorphic fancy may sift bran and think it flour', and explains it in the following way: "Other formulations like "a person possessed of fancy" and "a fanciful person" may sound better, but they fail to reflect the semantic process which lead to them [i.e. anthropomorphization – A.K.], so I stick to the more revealing if clumsier formulation".

6. In ordinary language, God and the devil also display a strong affinity for grammaticalization. *God!* is in many languages an interjection used to express surprise or regret. *Devil* is in some languages a strong swearword and is avoided. In some other languages, e.g. in the speech of some male Estonians, *kurat* practically takes the place of comma. The "grammaticalization" of swearwords and terms of abuse is generally well-known and frequent. Take, for example, the following joke on the Russian "indefinite article".
   Armenian Radio was asked: Should the Russian indefinite article блядь *be used before or after the headword?*
   Armenian Radio answered: the Russian indefinite article блядь *must be used both before and after the headword.*

7. Things are much worse if the metonymical reading is also excluded.
   In Philip Wheelwright's book *Metaphor and Reality* (1962: 149), there is a fragment from the lost play of Aeschylos, *The Daughters of Danae*:
   The pure sky [Ouranos] desires to penetrate the earth, and the earth is filled with love so that she longs for blissful union with the sky. The rain falling from the beautiful sky [Ouranos] impregnates the earth, so that she gives birth to fodder and grain for flocks and man.
   [NB! *Gaia* is here translated as 'earth']
   Wheelright comments upon this as follows: "Nevertheless the passage reflects a type of utterance that had be current in an earlier mythopoeic period, in which no linguistic and hence no clearly conceptual distinction had yet been drawn between the physical sky and the divine personage Ouranos."

The situation is very difficult to understand for a person with a modern mindset. As there is no division into two plans of meaning, there is also no reason to speak not only about personification or depersonification as such, but also about literal speech as such. We become totally confused! Here we do not have a story about certain meteorological and biological events figuratively expressed in terms of the sexual intercourse between the Greek gods. Nor is it a description of sexual intercourse between the Greek gods expressed figuratively in meteorological and biological terms, or a literal expression in the usual sense. It is quite simply a verbal output of mythological thinking.

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